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Recent Cases
BAIL-CONDITIONS OF PRETRIAL RELEASE
FOR THE INDIGENT DEFENDANT
Commonwealth ex rel. Hartage v. Hendrick,
439 Pa. 584, 268 A.2d 451 (1970).
In Commonwealth ex rel. Hartage v. Hendrick,' the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court was confronted with the question of what
constitutes proper bail for an indigent defendant who can afford
little or no bail. Hartage had filed a petition for habeas corpus
with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, requesting the court to ex-
ercise its power of original jurisdiction in habeas corpus proceed-
ings. 2 The majority refused to take original jurisdiction3 but indi-
cated that existing problems in the Pennsylvania bail system4 are
1. 439 Pa. 584, 268 A.2d 451 (1970).
2. PA. House BILL No. 1562:
§ 201 Original Jurisdiction - The Supreme Court shall have original
but not exclusive jurisdiction of (1) all cases of habeas corpus.
3. 439 Pa. 584, 585-89, 268 A.2d 451, 451-53 (1970).
4. Bail, as it is presently administered in Pennsylvania, is governed
by the PA. R. CRiM. P. 4001-16 which provide in part:
Rule 4001. Definitions Pertaining to Bail.
(a) Bail is the security required and given for the release of a
person in the custody of the law, conditioned upon a written under-
taking that he will appear when required and do all other things
stipulated therein.
(b) Nominal bail is bail secured by the sum of one dollar, con-
ditioned upon a written undertaking signed by the defendant as
principal and an official designated by the issuing authority or the
court to act as surety.
Rule 4002. Authorization of Bail.
(a) By issuing authority: All persons may be admitted to bail
in all cases as now provided by law, and in addition thereto if the
attorney for the Commonwealth agrees, the issuing authority may
also admit to bail any defendant who is charged with arson, rape,
mayhem, sodomy, burglary, robbery, or involuntary manslaughter.
(b) By court:
(1) Where the issuing authority has no jurisdiction to admit to
in need of correction. Two dissenting opinions, the first by Mr.
Chief Justice Bell5 and the second by Mr. Justice Roberts,6 present
antithetical views of the problems inherent in the current Pennsyl-
vania bail system.
Hartage challenged his bail7 on the ground that it violated the
Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution." He con-
tended that the prohibition against excessive bail must be read
"to prohibit bail in excess of what petitioner can afford."U Hartage
also contended that his bail was set "without consideration of in-
dividual circumstances pertinent to the probability of his appear-
ance at trial."10 The majority never reached the merits of the case
because of their refusal to take original jurisdiction.
Hartage asked the supreme court to take original jurisdiction
for two reasons. First, he alleged that the issues involved in the
case were of "vital importance throughout the Commonwealth and
should be decided by this Court."'" Of greater importance was
Hartage's second assertion that if the court refused to take origi-
nal jurisdiction and required him to follow the time consuming ap-
pellate procedure via the superior court, the issues would become
moot before the supreme court could hear them.'2 In support of
this proposition Hartage cited Commonwealth ex rel. Ford v. Hend-
rick,13 which had presented questions identical to the present case.
1 4
bail, a court may entertain an application for bail;
(2) Upon application by the defendant or his attorney, a court
may grant appropriate relief where bail has been denied or ex-
cessive bail demanded; and
(3) Where a defendant is charged with a capital offense, a court
may admit to bail as provided in the Constitution. On application
for such bail the burden shall be on the Commonwealth to show
that the defendant has no right to bail.
Rule 4005. Ascertaining the Amount of Bail.
(a) The amount of bail shall be such as to ensure the presence of
the defendant, and shall be determined according to, but not solely,
upon the following criteria:
(1) The nature and circumstances of the offense and the stage of
the prosecution then existing;
(2) The age, residence, employment, financial standing and fam-
ily status of the defendant;
(3) Defendant's character, reputation and previous criminal his-
tory; and
(4) Defendant's mental condition.
(b) A court may, for cause, increase or reduce the amount of
bail or require new or additional bail; See also PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
19, §§ 51-95 (1964).
5. 439 Pa. 584, 589, 268 A.2d 451, 453 (1970) (dissenting opinion).
6. Id. at 594, 268 A.2d at 455 (dissenting opinion).
7. Bail was set at $3500. 439 Pa. at 591 n.4, 298 A.2d at 454 n.4.
8. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII provides in part "Excessive bail shall
not be required .. "
9. 439 Pa. 584, 586, 268 A.2d 451 (1970). See notes 61-67 and accom-
panying text infra.
10. 439 Pa. 584, 586, 268 A.2d 451 (1970). This appears to be a
secondary argument based on PA. R. CHiM. P. 4005 (a). (See note 4 supra).
11. 439 Pa. at 586, 268 A.2d at 451.
12. Id.
13. 215 Pa. Super. 206, 257 A.2d 657 (1969).
14. The Ford case involved two indigents, Ford and Tucker, who were
Recent Cases
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
In the Ford case the defendant had followed the "normal appellate
route" through the superior court but the case never reached the
supreme court due to mootness.
15
The majority, however, was not swayed by Hartage's allegation
of inevitable mootness; nor did they believe, based on the "most
meager factual record,'" that he had demonstrated "the futility of
the ordinary appellate procedures."'17 The majority observed that
the petitioner's bail hearing had been "inadequate""8 and all that
had been established was "that petitioner had no prior criminal rec-
ord and according to our [defendant's representatives] information
he can afford little bail."'19 Although such a limited factual deter-
mination at the bail hearing is in violation of the present Pennsyl-
vania Rules of Criminal Procedure governing bail,20 Hartage did not
raise this issue in the lower court in his initial petition for habeas
corpus.
21
In answer to the question of original jurisdiction the majority
concluded:
There is not here the "imperative necessity or apparent rea-
son why expedition is desirable or required," that this
Court normally requires in a habeas corpus proceeding in
order to dispense with the benefit of full and adequate con-
sideration by a lower court.
22
accused of robbery. Bail was set at $3000 for Tucker and $1000 for Ford.
Both filed petitions with the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia for a
writ of habeas corpus, claiming, due to their indigency, that the bail was
excessive. The court of common pleas denied the petitions and the
superior court of Pennsylvania affirmed the denial. Id. at 208, 257 A.2d
at 657.
15. See text accompanying note 29 infra.
16. 439 Pa. 584, 588, 268 A.2d 451, 453 (1970).
17. Id., 268 A.2d at 452.
18. Id. at 587, 268 A.2d at 452. For a discussion of the practices at
bail hearings see Wettick and McClellan, Bail Practices in Allegheny
County, 8 DUQUESNE L. REV. 73, 80-82 (1969-70).
19. 439 Pa. 584, 587 n.1, 268 A.2d 451, 452 n.l. Hartage asserted that:
"Bail hearings for indigents who cannot retain counsel are virtu-
ally never adequate." Petitioner was not represented by counsel
but by a law student connected with the Bail Litigation Project of
the University of Pennsylvania Law School, which is under the
direction of present counsel for petitioner.
Id.
20. See note 4 supra.
21. 439 Pa. 584, 587 n.2, 268 A.2d 451, 452 n.2 (1970) (transcript of
proceeding in lower court).
22. Id. at 588, 268 A.2d at 452. The test suggested by the majority is
obviously a nebulous one and a review of several cases where the question
of original jurisdiction is presented suggests that the decision is generally
an ad hoc one. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex tel. Sproval v. Hendrick, 438
Pa. 435, 265 A.2d 348 (1970); Commonwealth ex tel. Torrance v. Salzinger,
406 Pa. 268, 177 A.2d 619 (1962); Commonwealth ex Tel. Sleighter v. Ban-
miller, 392 Pa. 132, 139 A.2d 918 (1958); Commonwealth ex rel. Paylor v.
From this statement it appears that the petitioner's plight was
the result of his failure to pursue all possible issues at the initial
stages of litigation. It is also apparent from dictum in the majority
opinion that the decision rested at least partially on other grounds.
The majority did not fail to recognize that problems abound within
the present Pennsylvania bail system. They stated:
[W] e do not intend to minimize the seriousness of the prob-
lems connected with bail and pretrial detention, particu-
larly as applied to indigents. These problems have been re-
ceiving increasing attention from legal writers, concerned
organizations, and various governmental bodies, but have
not yet received adequate attention from the courts, includ-
ing no doubt those of Pennsylvania.
23
However, the majority expressed the view that the preferred
method of reforming the rules governing bail would be through the
recommendations of the Pennsylvania Criminal Procedural Rules
Committee..2 4 They cited favorably the standards related to pre-
trial release proposed by the American Bar Association as a possi-
ble guide for bail reform.25 The majority concluded:
This approach to a complex and pervasive socio-legal prob-
lem appears to us much sounder than an ad hoc approach of
taking original jurisdiction in a particular case.
26
From this statement it appears the majority did not base its deci-
sion solely on the procedural errors of the petitioner.
Mr. Justice Roberts, in his dissenting opinion,27 felt that the
court should grant original jurisdiction and remit the case for fur-
ther proceedings consistent with the guidelines described in his
opinion. 28 Unlike the majority, Mr. Justice Roberts believed that
Hartage had demonstrated the futility of proceeding through the
ordinary appellate channels:
I believe the test for assuming jurisdiction in the instant
case should not be whether this petitioner has fully ex-
hausted his other remedies, but whether he stands a rea-
sonable chance of getting to this Court if he attempts to
proceed in the usual fashion. Past experience indicates
that he does not stand that chance. Indeed, given the nor-
mal time lag in our appellate procedures, it is difficult to
Claudy, 366 Pa. 282, 77 A.2d 350 (1951); Commonwealth ex rel. Milewski v.
Ashe, 362 Pa. 48, 66 A.2d 281 (1949).
23. 439 Pa. 584, 588, 268 A.2d 452, 453 (1970) (footnotes omitted).
See, e.g., Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis In Bail, 113 U. PA. L.
REv. 959 (1965); Wettick and McClellan, Bail Practices in Allegheny
County, 8 DUQUESNE L. REv. 73 (1969-70); Comment, Compelling Appear-
ance in Court: Administration of Bail in Philadelphia, 102 U. PA. L. REV.
1031 (1954).
24. 439 Pa. at 589, 268 A.2d at 453.
25. Id. at 593, 268 A.2d at 453. The majority was referring to AMERI-
CAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE-STANDARDS RELATING To PRETRIAL RELEASE (Approved Draft, 1968)
[hereinafter cited A.B.A.: PRETRIAL RELEASE].
26. 439 Pa. at 589, 268 A.2d at 453.
27. Id. at 584, 594, 268 A.2d 451, 455 (1970) (dissenting opinion).
28. Id. at 596, 268 A.2d at 456.
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imagine how this question will ever come before us in the
"normal" fashion. For no such case has heretofore reached
this Court on the merits, and the majority is silent on how
any litigant will ever achieve what Ford did not, and what
Hartage has today been denied.
29
Justice Roberts also criticized the majority for its statement that
"expedition is not desirable or required, '30 since the case affects
prisoners at that time incarcerated due to their indigency.
3 1
Furthermore, Justice Roberts was of the opinion that reliance
on the Criminal Procedural Rules Committee was an "abdication of
this Court's responsibility."32 In his view the "amount and type
of bail and the conditions under which any individual ought to be
admitted to bail are simply not procedural matters. '33 He felt that
the court should define such substantive rights and it would then
be for the Criminal Procedural Rules Committee to set forth the
"manner in which an accused can assert his rights. .... -34
Mr. Justice Roberts, in discussing the constitutional aspects of
bail, concluded that the only proper purpose of bail is to assure the
defendant's presence at trial.3 5 For this proposition Justice Rob-
erts cited the language of the United States Supreme Court in
Stack v. Boyle:" "Bail set at a figure higher than an amount rea-
sonably calculated to fulfill this purpose [to assure defendant's
presence at trial] is excessive under the Eighth Amendment.
3 7 It
was his conclusion that the decision in Stack implied that any sys-
tem of preventive detention was unconstitutional.38 The Stack de-
cision has, however, been interpreted by other courts and writers
not to mean that preventive detention is unconstitutional.39
29. Id. at 594, 268 A.2d at 456.
30. Id. at 588, 268 A.2d at 452.
31. Id. at 595, 268 A.2d at 456.
32. Id. at 594, 268 A.2d at 456.
33. Id. at 595, 268 A.2d at 456.
34. Id. at 596, 268 A.2d at 456.
35. Id., 268 A.2d at 457; accord, Cohen v. United States, 82 S. Ct. 526
(Douglas, Circuit Justice, 1962); Reynolds v. United States, 80 S. Ct. 30
(Douglas, Circuit Justice, 1959); Smith v. United States, 357 F.2d 486 (5th
Cir. 1966); United States v. Accardi, 241 F. Supp. 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1964),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 954 (1965); Whitty v. State, 34 Wis. 2d 278, 149 N.W.2d
557 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 959 (1968). Contra, Carbo v. United
States, 82 S. Ct. 662 (Douglas, Circuit Justice, 1962); Leigh v. United
States, 82 S. Ct. 994 (Douglas, Circuit Justice, 1962); Carlson v. Landon,
342 U.S. 542 (1952) (construed in Commonwealth ex rel. Ford v. Hen-
drick, 215 Pa. Super. 206, 212, 257 A.2d 657, 659 (1969) (dissenting opin-
ion) ); Mastrian v. Hedman, 326 F.2d 708 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 376 U.S.
965 (1964); Painten v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 254 F. Supp. 246
(D. Mass. 1966).
36. 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
37. 439 Pa. 584, 596, 268 A.2d 451, 457 (1970) (emphasis in original).
38. Id. at 584, 597 n.3, 268 A.2d 452, 457 n.3 (1970).
39. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Ford v. Hendrick, 215 Pa. Super.
Justice Roberts described what he felt to be the proper princi-
ples for improving the present bail system. His major premise was
that:
[I]t should be presumed that an accused is entitled to be
released on his own recognizance, which presumption may
only be overcome by a specific, on the record finding that
there is a substantial risk of nonappearance. Only by the
least restrictive measures consistent with counterbalancing
the risk of nonappearance should be utilized in any given
case.
40
As examples of such non-restrictive alternatives to money bail, Jus-
tice Roberts suggested those described in A.B.A.: Pretrial Release
such as:
(1) [A] n accused could be released into the care of a quali-
fied person or organization which would be responsible for
supervising the accused and assisting him in making his
court appearances; (2) an accused could be released under
a probation-type arrangement whereby he would be re-
sponsible for making regular contact with some responsible
official; (3) an accused could be released on the condition
that he agree to certain appropriate restrictions on his ac-
tivities; (4) an accused could be made to participate in a
work-release type program or could be required to live in
something like a 'halfway house' ... 41
As to the continued use of money bail as a condition of release Jus-
tice Roberts offered several observations. First, "it should be util-
ized only in those instances in which no other, less onerous, condi-
tion can provide the necessary assurance of subsequent appear-
ance.' '42 Secondly, Justice Roberts contended that the use of fi-
nancial bonds 43 as a condition to release should be administered by
206 n.3, 257 A.2d 657, 659 n.3 (1969) (dissenting opinion) and authorities
cited therein; Note, Preventive Detention Before Trial, 79 HARV. L. REV.
1489, 1498-1500 (1966).
40. 439 Pa. 584, 598, 268 A.2d 452, 457 (1970) (footnotes omitted).
Accord, A.B.A.: PRETRIAL RELEASE §§ 1.1, 5.1; Wyo. R. CRIM. P. 8 § C (dis-
cussed in Bail In Wyoming Under The Wyoming Rules Of Criminal Pro-
cedure, 5 LAND & WATER L. REv. 621 (1970)). See also authorities cited
at note 74 infra.
41. 439 Pa. 584, 598, 268 A.2d 451, 457-458 (1970). These conditions of
release, as described in A.B.A.: PRETRIAL RELEASE § 5.2 and Comments, are
only imposed when it is found that the accused is not entitled to be re-
leased on his own recognizance.
42. 439 Pa. 584, 600, 268 A.2d 451, 458 (1970) (footnotes omitted);
accord, A.B.A.: PRETRIAL RELEASE.
43. 439 Pa. 584, 599 n.8, 268 A.2d 451, 458 n.8 (1970). Justice Roberts
favored the use of a 10% downpayment plan where the accused pays the
judicial officer 10% of the bail and upon appearing for trial would receive
all but a small administrative fee back. This scheme is described in
A.B.A.: PRETMAL RELEASE § 5.3(c) (ii) and Comments. For a further dis-
cussion of the merits of this plan, see Commonwealth ex rel. Ford v.
Hendrick, 215 Pa. Super. 206, 226-33, 257 A.2d 657, 666-70 (1969) (dissent-
ing opinion) and cases cited therein. Illinois adopted such a plan by stat-
ute, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 110-7 (Supp. 1971), and:
[S]tatistics show that in 1964 in the circuit court for Cook County,
bondsmen wrote 600 bonds and suffered forfeiture in 6.3 per cent
of the cases while the state through its 10 per cent provision cov-
ered 686 bonds and suffered only 5.4 per cent forfeiture.
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the courts rather than professional bondsmen.44 Finally, in line
with his constitutional theory of bail he stated:
[T] he setting of money bail in an amount which is clearly
higher than a given accused could afford is never appropri-
ate. If it is determined that no amount of money bail which
the accused can provide, and no other reasonable restriction
short of incarceration will guarantee the accused's presence
at subsequent proceedings, then incarceration, not an illu-
sory and improbable bail is the appropriate restriction.
45
Mr. Justice Roberts offered numerous arguments in support of
the principles he proposed. Besides the tremendous cost to the tax-
payer of pretrial incarceration, 46 there are numerous effects felt
by the accused. 47 It is quite possible that one accused of a crime
may eventually be exonerated of all guilt. Yet if he is unable to
post bail, the sentence may already have been served.
48
There are several aspects of the constitutionality of bail which
Justice Roberts, as well as the other Justices, failed to mention.
The first is whether there is an absolute federal right to bail for
non-capital offenses, or merely a right to nonexcessive bail when
bail itself is allowed.49 Justice Roberts does not discuss this point,
nor is it possible to determine his position from the opinion. Mr.
Note, Bail In The United States: A System In Need Of Reform, 20
HASTINGs L. REV. 380, 401 (1968).
44. 439 Pa. 584, 599 n.8, 268 A.2d 41, 458 n.8 (1970); accord, Pannell
v. United States, 320 F.2d 698, 699-702 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (dissenting opin-
ion); Commonwealth ex rel. Ford v. Hendrick, 215 Pa. Super. 206, 226-32,
257 A.2d 657, 666-70 (1969) (dissenting opinion); A.B.A.: PRETRIAL RE-
LEASE §§ 5.3 (d),(e) and Comments; Note, Bail Or Jail: Toward An Alter-
native, 21 U. FLA. L. REV. 59, 60-62 (1968).
45. 439 Pa. 584, 600-01, 268 A.2d 451, 459 (1970) (dissenting opinion).
46. Id. at 601 n.11, 268 A.2d at 459 n.11. See, e.g., Kennedy, VISTA
Volunteers Bringing About Successful Bail Reform Project In Baltimore,
54 A.B.A.J. 1093, 1095-96 (1968).
47. 439 Pa. 584, 601, 268 A.2d 451, 459 (1970). Besides the obvious
effects of pretrial incarceration such as loss of job, inability to aid attor-
ney, etc., it is also suggested that there is a direct correlation between the
denial of bail and conviction. For this proposition see Rankin, The Effect
of Pretrial Detention, 39 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 641 (1964). For a discussion of
the effects of pretrial incarceration see, e.g., Fabricant, Bail As A Preferred
Freedom And The Failure Of New York's Revision, 18 BUFFALO L. REV. 303,
304-07 (1968); Comment, A Study Of The Administration Of Bail In New
York City, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 693 (1958); Comment, Compelling Appear-
ance In Court: Administration Of Bail In Philadelphia, 102 U. PA. L. REv.
1031 (1954).
48. 439 Pa. 584, 601 n.12, 268 A.2d 451, 459 (1970).
49. This is a subject of much dispute. See generally Bloss v. Michi-
gan, 421 F.2d 903, 905 (6th Cir. 1970) (not absolute); United States v. Mel-
ville, 309 F. Supp. 822, 823 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (absolute on proper conditions);
Commonwealth ex rel. Ford v. Hendrick, 215 Pa. Super. 206, 213, 257 A.2d
657, 660 (1969) (not absolute); Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis In
Bail, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 959 (1965); Mitchell, Bail Reform And The Consti-
tutionality Of Pretrial Detention, 55 VA. L. REv. 1223 (1969).
Justice Roberts also does not discuss the effects of the Pennsylvania
Constitution on bail. °50 Mr. Justice Hoffman, in his dissenting opin-
ion in Commonwealth ex tel. Ford v. Hendrick,5' argued that the
Pennsylvania Constitution has never been interpreted as granting
an absolute right to bail in non-capital offenses. 52
Another interesting point never specifically mentioned by Jus-
tice Roberts, is whether or not the federal prohibition of excessive
bail is binding on the states. From his reliance on the language in
Stack it could be inferred that he is of the opinion that the states are
bound. But this question has not been decided by the United States
Supreme Court 53 and at present there is a split of authority.
54
Mr. Chief Justice Bell, in his dissenting opinion,55 favored
granting original jurisdiction and deciding the case on its merits.
56
Citing the "very real possibility of mootness"5 7 in such cases as the
present one, Mr. Chief Justice Bell argued that the court should
not forego the opportunity to decide the issues presented. Clearly
though, he would not have decided the issues in favor of the peti-
tioner. Referring to the "[d] angerous criminals who are out on
bail . . . jeopardizing the safety and the lives of the lawabiding
public by committing additional crimes,"58 Mr. Chief Justice Bell
chastised "unrealistic or mollycoddling Judges who release on un-
realistic bail prisoners who are accused of ruthless crimes, thus en-
abling them to further endanger our citizens."59 He stated:
It is important that we (1) forthwith reaffirm our pres-
ent Rules which were recommended by our Criminal Pro-
cedural Rules Committee and adopted by this Court (and
made effective) as recently as June 1966, and likewise (2)
re-emphasize those guidelines and principles which will
(a) likely compel a person out on bail to appear for trial,
and (b) also properly protect the public against dangerous
criminals and "repeaters," or in the alternative promptly
change our rules, guidelines and principles."
The Chief Justice found no merit in Hartage's constitutional
50. See note 68 infra.
51. 215 Pa. Super. 206, 257 A.2d 657 (1969).
52. Id. at 213-14, 257 A.2d at 660 (dissenting opinion). See also Cogan,
The Pennsylvania Bail Provisions: The Legality Of Preventive Detention,
44 TEMP. L.Q. 51 (1970).
53. The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Robinson
v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), held only that the prohibition of cruel
and unusual punishment by the eighth amendment was binding on the
states.
54. See, e.g., Siegle v. Follette, 290 F. Supp. 632 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (bind-
ing on states) and cases cited therein; Rendel v. Mummert, 106 Ariz. 233,
474 P.2d 824 (1970) (not binding on states) and cases cited therein; Note,
The Bail System: Is It Acceptable?, 29 OBto ST. .J. 1005, 1018 (1968).
55. 439 Pa. 584, 589, 268 A.2d 451, 453 (1970) (dissenting opinion).
56. Id. at 589, 268 A.2d at 453.
57. Id. at 590, 268 A.2d at 453 (emphasis in original).
58. Id. at 489, 268 A.2d at 453.
59. Id. (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).




arguments. As to the idea that a money bail system denies to poor
people the "equal protection of the law""' he stated:
This ignores the facts of life, and would be an unwarranted
Procrustean stretch of the Constitution. Poverty and un-
equal possession of wealth exist in so many phases and
fields of life that Courts cannot make mere lack of money,
without more, a denial of the equal protection of the law.62
The argument that bail in excess of what an indigent can af-
ford, which is generally quite minimal, constitutes a denial of equal
protection has not been decided by the United States Supreme
Court. The overwhelming majority of federal courts which have
faced this question have held that it does not constitute a denial of
equal protection. '3 Several writers have criticized this view64 in
light of the number of United States Supreme Court decisions which
have held that a defendant's financial ability will not be permitted
to impair his legal rights.0 5 Mr. Justice Douglas in Bandy v. United
States60 stated:
To continue to demand a substantial bond which the de-
fendant is unable to secure raises considerable problems
for the equal administration of the law. We have held that
an indigent defendant is denied equal protection of the law
if he is denied an appeal on equal terms with other defend-
ants, solely because of his indigence. [Citing Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1955] ...Can an indigent be de-
nied freedom, where a wealthy man would not, because he
does not happen to have enough property to pledge for his
freedom?67
This view, however, has received little support in the courts.
Mr. Chief Justice Bell explained that what is constitutionally
required of bail is "bail with sufficient surities, with a proviso that
the bail must not be excessive."68  Furthermore, he contended
61. Id. at 591, 268 A.2d at 454.
62. Id. (footnotes omitted).
63. See, e.g., United States v. Radford, 361 F.2d 777, 781 (4th Cir.
1966); Hodgdon v. United States, 365 F.2d 679, 687 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. de-
nied, 385 U.S. 1029 (1967); White v. United States, 330 F.2d 811, 814 (8th
Cir. 1964).
64. See, e.g., Note, The Bail System: Is It Acceptable?, 29 Omo ST.
L.J. 1005 (1968).
65. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1962) (right to counsel);
Douglas v. California, 368 U.S. 815 (1961) (counsel on appeal); Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (free transcript on appeal). See generally
Wettick and McClellan, Bail Practices in Allegheny County, 8 DUQUESNE
L. REv. 73, 73-76 (1969-70).
66. 81 S. Ct. 197 (Douglas, Circuit Justice, 1960).
67. Id. at 197-98.
68. 439 Pa. 584, 591-92, 268 A.2d 451, 454 (emphasis in original) (dis-
senting opinion). The constitutional provisions cited by Chief Justice Bell
were (1) U.S. CONST. amend. VIII which provides in part, "Excessive bail
that a presumption that an accused is entitled to be released on his
own recognizance is "contrary to the clear language of the constitu-
tion."69
Mr. Chief Justice Bell also explained that "Money bail is not
the sole and exclusive kind of bail required by the constitution."
70
He did, however, not support the alternatives to money bail sug-
gested by Mr. Justice Roberts71 such as release of the accused to a
qualified person or organization:
72
Realistically speaking, where would such qualified persons
or organizations be found to take care of, each and every
year, more than several thousand accused and ofttimes
dangerous criminals?7
3
In short, the Chief Justice found all such alternatives to money
bail, as suggested by Mr. Justice Roberts, to be "unrealistic."
74
The Chief Justice's dissent mentioned that Congress has en-
acted a bill authorizing so-called preventive detention in the Dis-
trict of Columbia 5 but offered no opinion as to its constitutional-
shall not be required . . ."; (2) PA. CoNsT. art. I, § 13 which provides in
part, "Excessive bail shall not be required ..."; and (3) PA. CONST. art. I,
§ 14 which provides in part, "All prisoners shall be bailable by sufficient
sureties, unless for capital offenses when the proof is evident or presump-
tion great .. " The Chief Justice offered no opinion as to the effect of the
United States Constitution prohibition of excessive bail on the states. See
notes 53 and 54 and accompanying text supra.
69. 439 Pa. 584, 592, 268 A.2d 451, 455 (1970) (dissenting opinion) (The
Chief Justice does not indicate which Constitution he is referring to). Mr.
Justice Roberts contended that such a presumption (release on own re-
cognizance) should be adopted. See note 40 and accompanying text supra.
70. 439 Pa. at 591, 268 A.2d at 454 (emphasis in original) (dissenting
opinion). While this argument may be correct, PA. R. CRim. P. 4001 (a)
defines bail as "The security required and given for the release of a person
in the custody of the law. . ." and PA. R. Calm. P. 3 (j) defines security as
including "Cash, certified check, money order, personal check or guaranteed
arrest bond or bail bond certificate." Thus, it appears that money bail is
the only type available. The use of "nominal bail" (bail secured by one
dollar) as described in the PA. R. Cnm. P. 4001 (b) and 4007 (see note 4
supra) could serve as an appropriate remedy when the accused is indigent,
but there is no discussion of this practice in the principal case. For an
examination of the use of nominal bail see Wettick and McClellan, Bail
Practices in Allegheny County, 8 DUQUESNE L. REV. 73, 73-76 (1969-70).
71. See text accompanying note 41 supra.
72. 439 Pa. 584, 592-93. 268 A.2d 451, 455 (1970) (dissenting opinion).
73. Id. at 593, 268 A.2d at 455.
74. Id. Such non-monetary alternatives have been fully incorporated
in the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1966, 18 U.S.C. § 1346. Such measures
have also been proposed by the American Bar Association, A.B.A.: PRETRIAL
RELEASE § 5.2 and Comments at 56-58. For a good discussion of how such
proposals work in practice see Kennedy, VISTA Volunteers Bring About
Successful Bail Reform Project in Baltimore, 54 A.B.A.J. 1093 (1968); Ares,
Rankin and Sturz, The Manhattan Bail Project: An Interim Report On The
Use Of Pre-Trial Parole 38 N.Y.U. L. REv. 67 (1963). See also Hill, Bail
and Recognizance In Alabama: Some Suggested Reforms, 21 ALA. L. REv.
601, 616-18 (1969); Note, Bail In The United States: A System In Need Of
Reform, 20 -AsT NGS L.J. 380 (1968); Comment, Bail Reform in the State
and Federal Systems, 20 VAND. L. REV. 948 (1967).
75. District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act
of 1970, Pus. L. No. 91-358, §§ 23-1321, 23-1332 (8 United States Code Con-
gressional and Administrative News at 2713-23 (Aug. 20, 1970) ). This Act
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ity.76 The concept of pretrial detention of dangerous criminals with
no provision for bail has been the subject of much debate. 77 The
arguments supporting pretrial detention center around the need for
protecting the public from dangerous criminals.78 Its supporters
assert that preventive detention is constitutional if certain pro-
cedural safeguards are provided the defendant.79  Opponents of
preventive detention argue that the only proper function of the
bail system is to assure the presence of the defendant at trial.
Bail may not be used to prevent future crimes.80 Those opposed to
preventive detention also argue that even if procedural safeguards,
such as a full scale judicial hearing prior to imposing preventive
detention, would make it constitutional, such hearings would con-
stitute an unnecessary burden on the courts.8' A final argument is
that an accurate determination of whether or not an individual
constitutes a threat to the public is impossible.
8 2
Finally, Mr. Chief Justice Bell concluded that the majority
opinion carried with it "an implied recommendation of major
applies only to the District of Columbia (§ 23-1332). The procedure for
determining if the defendant should be detained is set out in section
23-1322.
76. 439 Pa. 584, 590 n.3, 268 A.2d 451, 454 n.3 (1970) (dissenting opin-
ion).
77. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Ford v. Hendrick, 215 Pa. Super.
206, 209-26, 257 A.2d 657, 657-66 (1969) (dissenting opinion); Cogan, The
Pennsylvania Bail Provisions: The Legality Of Preventive Detention,
44 T mp. L.Q. 51 (1970); Mitchell, Bail Reform And The Constitutionality
Of Pretrial Detention, 55 VA. L. REV. 1223 (1969); Note, Preventive De-
tention, 36 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 178 (1967-68); Note, Preventive Detention
Before Trial, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1489 (1966).
78. Mr. Chief Justice Bell's discussion of the threat to the public due
to the release of dangerous criminals is typical of those arguments in favor
of pretrial detention. Attorney General Mitchell, although admitting the
statistics concerning crimes committed by defendants released on bail are
inconclusive, feels the problem is severe enough to warrant preventive de-
tention. Mitchell, Bail Reform And The Constitutionality Of Pretrial De-
tention, 55 VA. L. REV. 1223, 1240-42 (1969).
79. For a discussion of the present case authority which indicates that
a full and complete hearing to determine if the accused constitutes a
threat to the public is constitutionally required see Commonwealth ex rel.
Ford v. Hendrick, 215 Pa. Super. 206, 219-26, 257 A.2d 657, 262-66 (1969)
(dissenting opinion).
80. See cases cited note 35 and accompanying text supra.
81. Mr. Justice Roberts asserted that preventive detention was un-
constitutional. (See note 38 and accompanying text supra). But he also
felt that the procedural safeguards which might be offered to support
the constitutionality would be "an unwise and unnecessary burden to our
already crowded criminal court docket. . . ." 439 Pa. at 597 n.3, 268 A.2d
at 457 n.3. See also A.B.A.: PRETRIAL RELEASE at 5-7, 83-88.
82. See, e.g., Dershowitz, Preventing "Preventive Detention", NEw
YORK REV. OF BOOKS, vol. XII, No. 5, Mar. 13, 1969. Contra, Mitchell, Bail
Reform And The Constitutionality Of Pretrial Detention, 55 VA. L. REV.
1223, 1237-41 (1969).
changes in favor of accused criminals" which he felt was "very,
very unwise. '83 He also stated:
[T]he practical effect of the majority Opinion, and even
more so of Justice Roberts Opinion, is to create new un-
certainties and/or confusion in this field, of bail and further
jeopardize the safety of our citizens and their protection
from dangerous criminals.
8 4
Although it is not clear what changes in the present bail system
Chief Justice Bell would support, if any, it appears that he would
not favor any changes which increase the possibility of dangerous
criminals being released.
The present case may foreshadow the adoption of long needed
changes in the Pennsylvania bail system, particularly as it affects
indigents. Although the case may be easily discounted as judicial
stalling or buck-passing, several facts suggest a different result.
First, the majority could have simply denied the petition without
ever mentioning the existence of failings in the bail system. Sec-
ondly, the majority's recommendation of the American Bar Asso-
ciation's proposals with regard to pretrial release, which are also
reflected in Justice Roberts' dissenting opinion, cannot be ignored.
For the present time any decision on revised bail procedure rests
with the Criminal Procedural Rules Committee. Its failure to act,
however, could always be remedied by the supreme court accept-
ing a case such as Hartage's. As long as the present bail system re-
mains, such cases will be available.
G. DAVID PAULINE
83. 439 Pa. 584, 590, 268 A.2d 451, 454 (1970) (dissenting opinion).
84. 439 Pa. at 593, 268 A.2d at 455.
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS-ENFORCEMENT OF
RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS AGAINST COMPE-
TITION AFTER THE CONTRACT TIME FOR
PERFORMANCE HAS EXPIRED
Hayes v. Altman, 438 Pa. 451, 266 A.2d 269 (1970).
Hayes v. Altman1 provides a poignant reminder that court de-
lay causes serious difficulty in civil as well as criminal cases. In
Altman, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court refused to extend the
time for performance of an employment contract's restrictive cove-
nant against competition beyond the precise period specified in the
contract. 2 Although the employer, Hayes, had filed his action
shortly after the breach occurred,3 a six year court delay enabled
the employee, Altman, to violate the covenant throughout the pe-
riod specified in the contract. 4 Unless Hayes is willing and able to
assume the burden of pleading and proving damages from his six
year old claim, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision will al-
low Altman to escape liability for his breach of contract.5
The litigation between Thomas Hayes and Theodore Altman,
both licensed optometrists, spans six years.6 Their relationship be-
gan on a friendly basis during Altman's youth.7 Hayes treated
Altman's defective vision.8 It was Hayes who interested Altman
in optometry as a profession.9 After graduating from the Pennsyl-
vania State College of Optometry in 1954, Altman was employed
by John Hughes Associates."0 During part of his association with
John Hughes Associates, Altman worked part-time in Hayes's of-
fice.1
Altman left John Hughes Associates and began full-time work
in Hayes's office during the first week of January, 1959.12 A formal
employment contract was negotiated and signed late in 1959.13 The
1. 438 Pa. 451, 266 A.2d 269 (1970).
2. Id. at 456, 266 A.2d at 272.
3. Hayes filed his complaint on April 15, 1964. Record at 5a, Hayes
v. Altman, 438 Pa. 451, 266 A.2d 269 (1970).
4. 438 Pa. 451, 456, 266 A.2d 269, 271 (1970).
5. Id.
6. See notes 3, 5, supra.
7. Record at 14a, Hayes v. Altman, 424 Pa. 23, 225 A.2d 670 (1967).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 15a.
10. Id. at 148a.
11. Id. at 149a.
12. Id. at 155a.
13. Id. at 21a.
Agreement was dated "January 1, 1959" because certain option
clauses in the contract began to run from the date of employ-
ment.14 The contract provided for a five year employment term,15
and contained the following covenant:
IV. Restrictive Covenant. During the term of this agree-
ment, employee shall devote his best efforts and his entire
time to advance the interest of employer, and he shall not
directly or indirectly, alone or as a member of a partner-
ship, or as an officer, director, stockholder, or employee of
any other corporation, or employee of any other individual,
be engaged in or concerned with any work or services per-
taining to the practice of optometry. Following the termi-
nation of the term of this contract of employment, for any
cause whatsoever, employee shall not, directly or indirectly,
alone or as a member of a partnership or as an officer di-
rector, stockholder, or employee or [sic] any other corpora-
tion, or employee of any other individual, be engaged in
the practice of optometry in the Borough of Monroeville or
elsewhere within a radius of six air miles of the office of
employer herein, with the exception of that district of Pitts-
burgh lying north of the Allegheny River, and all Bor-
oughs and Townships lying north of said Allegheny River,
and with the further exception of Mt. Lebanon, Dormont,
and Brentwood, Allegheny County, for a period of three (3)
years from said termination of the term of this contract of
employment. Provided, however, that such restriction on
practice of optometry in Monroeville and elsewhere within
a radius of six (6) air miles shall not apply to employee in
the event employer, during his lifetime, shall discharge em-
ployee without cause.16
Although the contract expired on December 31, 1963, Altman
continued to work for Hayes until March 13, 1964.17 Hayes then
discharged Altman because Altman refused to execute another for-
mal employment agreement. 18
A few months after Altman's discharge, Hayes learned that
Altman intended to open an office in the Borough of Monroeville."
Hayes tried to dissuade Altman from opening the office by tele-
phone20 and by a registered letter"l which Altman did not answer.22
14. Id. at 21a.
15. Brief for Appellant at 26, Hayes v. Altman, 438 Pa. 451, 266 A.2d
269 (1970).
16. Id. at 28.
17. Record at 165a, Hayes v. Altman, 424 Pa. 23, 225 A.2d 670 (1967).
18. Id.
19. Id. at 25a.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 26a. The decay of the relationship between Hayes and Alt-
man can be best seen in the text of the letter. Record at 193a, Hayes v.
Altman, 424 Pa. 23, 225 A.2d 670 (1967):
Dear Ted: April 2, 1964
This is to confirm our phone conversation in which I told you that
I had heard that you were proceeding to open an office for the
practice of optometry in the Borough of Monroeville and reminded
you that to do so would be in violation of our Agreement of
January 1, 1959. You told me that where you might open an
office was none of my business and you refused to tell me anything
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When Altman opened his office despite Hayes's warnings, Hayes
filed an action in equity in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny
County.25 Hayes sought to enjoin Altman's practice in Monroe-
ville.2 4 The trial court dismissed Hayes's bill; ruling that the re-
strictive covenant was unenforceable because it was not reason-
ably necessary for Hayes's protection. 25 The court en banc upheld
the chancellor's decision. 26 Hayes appealed to the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court which reversed, holding that the covenant was rea-
sonable and enforceable.27 The trial court then issued a rule or-
dering Altman to show cause why a decree of specific performance
should not be entered against him.2" However, on January 24,
1968, the Chancellor signed an order dismissing the rule and refus-
ing the injunction. 29 Hayes filed exceptions to the chancellor's or-
der.3 0 Hayes sold his practice on or about September 1, 1968.3 1 The
court en banc did not hear Hayes's exceptions argued until July 23,
1969.32 After the hearing, the court entered a decree granting a
mandatory injunction requiring specific performance of the cove-
nant for a period of two years, eight and one-half months beginning
from July 23, 1969.33 The court refused Altman's petition for a re-
hearing.
34
Altman appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Because
no prior Pennsylvania case involving the extension of an employ-
of your plans.
This letter is written to caution you against any headstrong action
which will lead to your suffering such needless expenditure of
time and money as you might bring upon yourself. For, if you
violate our agreement by opening an office at a place in which
you have contracted not to practice for the three year period, I
shall ask the Court to compel you to cease and desist.
My attorney tells me that from an apparently reliable source he
heard a report that you were taking action to open an office on
Center Road in Monroeville, which would be a clear violation of
Paragraph IV of our Agreement, which provides ...
In face of this warning you cannot merit sympathy from me or
anyone else if the Court compels you to close down any such office
you may open in violation of our Agreement, either in Monroeville
or anywhere else within a radius of six miles of my office. I hope
you will not force me to go to Court to enforce my rights. But I
assure you that if you follow any irresponsible course of conduct,
I shall exhaust every legal remedy available to enforce my rights.
22. Record at 26a, Hayes v. Altman, 424 Pa. 23, 225 A.2d 670 (1967).
23. No. 442, July Term, 1964.
24. Record at 7a, Hayes v. Altman, 424 Pa. 23, 225 A.2d 670 (1967).
25. Id. at 212a.
26. Id. at 223a.
27. Hayes v. Altman, 424 Pa. 23, 225 A.2d 670 (1967).
28. Hayes v. Altman, 438 Pa. 451, 453, 266 A.2d 269 ,270 (1970).
29. Record at 34a, Hayes v. Altman, 438 Pa. 451, 266 A.2d 269 (1970).
30. Id. at 34a.
31. Hayes v. Altman, 438 Pa. 451, 266 A.2d 269 (1970).
32. Record at 35a, Hayes v. Altman, 438 Pa. 451, 266 A.2d 269 (1970).
33. Id. at 42a.
34. Id. at 54a.
ment contract restrictive covenant could be found,35 Altman urged
the court to adopt the holdings of other jurisdictions.3 As persua-
sive authority, Altman asked the court to consider the rule annun-
ciated in Corpus Juris Secundum:
Where protection is restricted by the agreement to a desig-
nated time, the agreement binds the parties as to the time
stipulated and after the expiration of the period, the pro-
hibition ceases to exist, and injunctive relief will not be af-
forded for a time beyond that for which the parties con-
tracted.
37
To indicate the basis for the Corpus Juris Secondum rule, Alt-
man cited cases which hold that the question of the enforceability of
a restrictive covenant is moot if the covenant's express time for per-
formance has expired.38 The most thorough discussion of the issue
in any of Altman's cited authority can be found in Meeker v. Stu-
art:3
9
We now reach the question as to what relief should be
awarded. Although the plaintiff has established his right
to an injunction, as of the proper time, nonetheless, since
the two year period referred to in the agreement has ex-
pired, no permanent injunction should be issued, for that
reason and solely for that reason . . . the plaintiff's relief
must be limited to damages. .... 4.
In Delong Corporation v. Lucas,41 a federal district court ruled
that an employer could not be granted injunctive relief after the
covenant period had elapsed:
[Defendant was] plainly relieved from such restriction
when the two years had expired. Thereafter, he was under
no such restriction and to impose a continuing restraint
upon him would not be in accordance with the agreement,
nor would the result be equitable.
4 2
Altman did not deny his violation of the covenant; 43 his case
rested solely upon a claim that once the covenant's express period
for performance had expired, courts are unable to order further
performance.
44
Hayes urged the court to extend general equitable principles
to the employment contract situation.45 Hayes cited a number of
35. Brief for Appellant at 10, Hayes v. Altman, 438 Pa. 451, 266
A.2d 269 (1970).
36. Id. at 9-23.
37. 43 C.J.S. Expiration of Period of Restraint § 84 (1945).
38. Abalene Pest Control Service, Inc. v. Hall, 220 A.2d 717 (Vt. 1966);
Weden v. Atherhold, 298 Mich. 142, 298 N.W. 483 (1941).
39. 188 F. Supp. 272 (D. D.C.), affd, 289 F.2d 902 (3rd Cir. 1960).
40. Id. at 276.
41. 176 F. Supp. 104 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 278 F.2d 804 (2d Cir. 1959).
42. Id. at 126.
43. See Brief for Appellant at 3-25, Hayes v. Altman, 438 Pa. 451,
266 A.2d 269 (1970).
44. Brief for Appellant at 9, Hayes v. Altman, 438 Pa. 451, 266 A.2d
269 (1970).




cases in which Pennsylvania courts had granted specific perform-
ance of land sale contracts after the contract performance period
had elapsed.46 The anchor of Hayes's case on this point was McFar-
land v. Gregory.4 7 McFarland involved plaintiffs who were devel-
oping an apartment-shopping center complex. 4s The defendants
had given plaintiffs a contract period of thirty-nine months to find
a purchaser for the project. 49 Defendants began to interfere with
the "exclusive agency" to such an extent that the plaintiffs were
unable to perform. 50 Plaintiffs brought suit for specific perform-
ance.51 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals allowed the extension
of the performance period so as to give plaintiffs time for performn-
ance equal to the time remaining in the contract term at the time
defendants began to interfere. 52 The court reasoned:
[In] the absence of record information to the contrary, we
must assume that [the parties' positions] in the dispute
[were] taken in good faith. Under these circumstances, to
permit a deduction of the period consumed by litigation
concerning the substance of plaintiffs' rights from the time
allowed for the exercise of the rights would be to place all
the risks of the conceded contractual ambiguities upon
plaintiffs' shoulders. By contrast, to extend the expira-
tion date of plaintiffs' rights would restore plaintiffs to the
status quo ante and would subject defendants to no clearly
specified disadvantage.53
Hayes sought to apply the McFarland ruling to his case claiming:
The learned court below in the case at bar applied this
(McFarland) rationale and gave the defendant credit for
the 3 months he has performed his restrictive covenant
and extended the time for performance by 2 years 8%
months to allow defendant the same amount of time to
perform following his default as was available to him at
the time his default began.
54
Altman also argued that after the sale of the business by Hayes
there could be no valid assignment of the restrictive covenant to a
third party because the contract between himself and Hayes made
no provision for such assignment. 55 Altman urged that Hayes
46. Erkess v. Eisenthal, 354 Pa. 161, 47 A.2d 154 (1946); Bloshinski v.
Falaz, 165 Pa. Super. 565, 79 A.2d 798 (1951).
47. 322 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1963).
48. Id. at 738.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 739.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 740.
54. Brief for Appellee at 13, Hayes v. Altman, 438 Pa. 451, 266 A.2d
269 (1970).
55. Brief for Appellant at 23, Hayes v. Altman, 438 Pa. 451, 266 A.2d
269 (1970).
could not claim that the existence of an enforceable covenant was
a prime factor in the sale of the practice because the sale followed
the trial court's ruling that the covenant was unenforceable. 6 Fur-
ther, Altman claimed that he had no knowledge of Hayes's vendee's
business and that no attempt had ever been made to lure the ven-
dee's clients away.
5 7
Hayes, on the other hand, argued that the employment con-
tract covenant was analogous to a no-competition covenant in a
contract for the sale of a business.,8 Hayes cited Gompers v. Ro-
chester59 which holds that a restrictive covenant against competi-
tion in a business-sale contract attaches and is incident to the prop-
erty and business and therefore will pass to a subsequent purchaser
as an incident of the sale.60 The Gompers rule is recognized in the
treatment of "Assignments" in American Jurisprudence Second:
An express assignment of the covenant to the subsequent
purchaser, however, is unnecessary; upon a subsequent sale
of the business, such covenant will pass as an incident of
the business even though not expressly assigned. . . The
covenant is treated as essentially part of the goodwill of the
business sold.6 '
Hayes also relied upon Jack Tratenberg, Inc. v. Komoroff 62 in
which an employer's assignee requested enforcement of a restrictive
covenant against an employee. 63 The Tratenberg court said:
It is plain that the reason for the rule of nonassignability
is absent where the assignee seeks simply to enjoin breach
of a contractual provision which can be of effect only af-
ter the termination of the personal employment relation-
ship.
64
It was also argued that Hayes's assignee needed the covenant's pro-
tection because the practice was still being carried on in Hayes's
name. 65
Hayes also made an argument which was not answered by
Altman 6 and almost ignored by the court.67 Hayes argued that he
was a victim of court delay and as such should not be penalized by
denial of the relief to which he was entitled at the time his action
was filed.68 The trial court, in granting the injunction which was
56. Id. at 24.
57. Id. at 25.
58. Brief for Appellee at 22, Hayes v. Altman, 438 Pa. 451, 266 A.2d
269 (1970).
59. 56 Pa. 194 (1867).
60. Id. at 198.
61. 6 AM. JuR. 2d Assignments § 19 (1963).
62. 87 Pa. D. & C. 1 (1951).
63. Id. at 3.
64. Id. at 12.
65. Brief for Appellee at 21, Hayes v. Altman, 438 Pa. 451, 266 A.2d
269 (1970).
66. See Brief for Appellant at 1-25, Hayes v. Altman, 438 Pa. 451, 266
A.2d 269 (1970).
67. See notes 76-77 and accompanying text infra.





The time involved in adjudicating a case should have no
effect whatsoever on the granting or refusing of the relief
itself or even in measuring the extent of the relief to be
granted. The delays occasioned by the operation of the
courts is an unpleasant burden cast upon the litigants since
they are helpless to correct it. The Court's delay certainly
affords no reason, in our opinion, for either denying liti-
gants the relief they seek or diminishing in any degree the
relief to which they are entitled when they promptly bring
their cause to court. To hold otherwise would mean that
the defendant-employee would be placed in a position of us-
ing the law's delay as a means, in and of itself, to destroy
the right entirely, to equitable relief to which the plaintiff
was entitled at the time the suit was brought. It would be
in effect a violation of Article I, See. 11 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution ...
At the time of entering into the employment contract in the
case at bar, the employer had a right to specific perform-
ance for breach of the restrictive covenant. The Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, by reversing the lower court in this
case, has said that the employer still had that right to spe-
cific performance of the restrictive covenant at the time
suit was promptly brought. And this right, in our opinion,
once established through proper legal process, cannot,
through the delay in adjudicating the case, be taken
away.69
Hayes claimed:
It is only by enforcing the reasoning set out by the Court
below in the case at bar in extending the time for perform-
ance that equity courts will be giving equal protection
under the law to every employer and every employee
throughout the State of Pennsylvania, regardless of the
fortuitous circumstances as to the county in which suit may
be brought or what particular judge may handle the case.70
In deciding the case in Altman's favor, the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court distinguished restrictive covenants against competi-
tion found in employment contracts from restrictive covenants
against competition found in contracts for the sale of a business.71
The court said:
A general covenant not to compete, however, imposes a
greater hardship upon an employe than upon a seller of a
business. An employe is prevented from practicing his
69. Record at 35a, Hayes v. Altman, 438 Pa. 451, 266 A.2d 269 (1970).
70. Brief for Appellee at 15, Hayes v. Altman, 438 Pa. 451, 266 A.2d
269 (1970).
71. Hayes v. Altman, 438 Pa. 451, 454, 266 A.2d 269, 270 (1970).
trade or skill, or from utilizing his experience in the partic-
ular type of work with which he is familiar. He may en-
counter difficulty in transferring his particular experience
and training to another line of work, and hence his ability
to earn a livelihood is seriously impaired. Further, the
employe will usually have few resources in reserve to fall
back upon, and he may find it difficult to uproot himself
and his family in order to move to a location beyond the
area of potential competition with his former employer.
Contrarywise, the mobility of capital permits the business
man to utilize his funds in other localities and in other in-
dustries. In view of this greater hardship imposed upon an
employe, general covenants not to compete which are ancil-
lary to employment will be subjected to a more stringent
test of reasonableness than that which is applied to such
restrictive covenants ancillary to the sale of the business.
7 2
The instant case was further distinguished from those in which
equity had extended the time for performance by the fact that in
each such case injury would have befallen the plaintiff if the ex-
tension were not granted.7 3  The court said that because Hayes
had sold his practice, he no longer needed the covenant's protec-
tion.74 Hayes's vendee was ruled to have no equitable claim to pro-
tection because any patient who would leave his practice for Alt-
man's had already done so.7  The court dealt with Hayes's "equal
protection" argument only superficially.7 6 It was held that be-
cause the instant case in no way reflects fraud or unnecessary de-
lay caused by Altman, Hayes's "equal protection" argument was
not germane.
77
The practical ramifications of the Altman decision are not
easily delineated. The case abounds in unique qualifying factors
which impede effective generalization. 8 However, it is now clear
that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considers restrictive cove-
nants in employment contracts as a class unto themselves. In deal-
ing with such covenants, the court will refuse to accept arguments
based solely upon analogy to the equitable principles applicable to
other contract cases. The deft distinction between employment
contract covenants and covenants in other contracts would seem
to allow a continuation of the equitable practice of granting ex-
tended performance periods in non-employment contract cases.
However, the power to extend performance might henceforth be
limited to those cases in which it can be proved that harm will ac-
crue to the plaintiff if the extension is refused.
7 9
Although the court refused to rule upon Hayes's "equal pro-
72. Id.





78. E.g., lengthy delay for which neither party was responsible,
Hayes's sale of his practice.
79. See notes 71-73 and accompanying text supra.
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tection" argument beyond the factual situation of the instant
case,80 it is clear that the time consumed by litigation will not be
considered as a factor favorable to a request for an extension of
performance time. Therefore, an employer should include in em-
ployment contract restrictive covenants an express provision that
the covenant performance period shall not begin to run until any
and all litigation concerning the covenant has been finally adjudi-
cated."' For maximum protection such a provision should require
that the running of the covenant performance period should be
suspended until final adjudication if litigation should arise after
the performance period begins to run.
The Altman court, however, did not completely ban an exten-
sion of performance time in employment contract covenants. It
appears that if it can be proved that the defendant is responsible
for the expiration of the covenant period before final adjudication
can be made, the court might allow an extension in order to avoid
rewarding the employee's dilatory tactics.
82
RUSSELL L. SCHETROMA
80. 438 Pa. 451, 456, 266 A.2d 269, 272 (1970); see also text accom-
panying notes 76-77 supra.
81. Altman urged that the entire problem was caused by faulty
draftsmanship on Hayes's part. Brief for Appellant at 15, Hayes v. Altman,
438 Pa. 451, 266 A.2d 269 (1970):
This issue would never have arisen had not the employer-drafts-
man failed to provide for this type of contingency. In almost every
restrictive covenant agreement employed in the business world,
there is a clause which provides for the happening of Court litiga-
tion. Invariably, the restrictive covenant clause states that the
prohibited time period restraint runs from the date of the termina-
tion of the Court proceeding relevant to that particular clause.
In other words, the period of restraint does not commence until all
Court proceedings are completed as to the restrictive clause in
question. In this case, if there had been a clause of this nature
the three-year period would have begun on January 20, 1967, which
is the date of the Supreme Court decision holding that this re-
strictive covenant clause was reasonable.
Further, almost 100 per cent of the employment contracts drawn
provide for liquidated damage procedures and as one can readily
see, this agreement is devoid of such provision.
82. 438 Pa. 451, 456, 266 A.2d 269, 272 (1970).
TAXATION-THE BUSINESS USE AND OCCUPANCY
TAX OF PHILADELPHIA AND THE UNIFORMITY
CLAUSE OF THE PENNSYLVANIA
CONSTITUTION
Wanamaker v. School District of Philadelphia,
441 Pa. 567, 274 A.2d 524 (1971).
In June of 1970 the Philadelphia City Council authorized the
School District of Philadelphia to "impose a tax for general public
school purposes on the use or occupancy of real estate within the
School District of Philadelphia. . ".."' The rate of tax is computed
according to a formula 2 which takes into consideration the amount
of space and time actually used or occupied by the business. Suit
was instituted by a group of real estate users challenging the con-
stitutionality of the tax on the grounds that it was an unequal tax
which violated the uniformity clause8 of the Pennsylvania Con-
stitution. The case was initially argued before Judge Edmund
B. Spaeth, Jr., after the supreme court refused to take original
jurisdiction. 4  Judge Spaeth declared the tax unconstitutional5
on two grounds: (1) that it was no different from a real property
tax and (2) that the "standard of measurement was not directly re-
lated to the exercise of any alleged privilege since the sole method
of computing the tax is the assessed value of the land."6 The su-
preme court reversed, declaring the tax a privilege tax on the use
of real estate.7 Justices Roberts and O'Brien dissented, stating it
was a tax on real estate which must be uniformly assessed.8
The majority based their decision primarily on Billings v.
1. Bill No. 1860(2) amending § 19-1800 of the Philadelphia Code.
441 Pa. 567, 569 n.2, 274 A.2d 524, 525 n.2 (1971).
2. Section 4 of Bill No. 1860 sets out the following formula by which
the tax shall be computed:
Square feet Days of actual
occupied or used Assessed Rate of use or occupancy
X X X
Total square feet Value Taxation
available for use 360
or occupancy on
the real estate
3. PA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (1969).
4. Wanamaker v. School District of Philadelphia, 441 Pa. 567, 571,
274 A.2d 524, 525 (1971).
5. Id.
6. Id. at 576, 274 A.2d at 528.
7. Id. at 578, 274 A.2d at 529.
8. Id. at 580, 274 A.2d at 530 (dissenting opinion).
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United States9 which differentiated taxes on the property itself
from taxes on the use to which the property is put.
It follows that it is not ownership but the election during
the taxing period of the owner to take advantage of one
of the elements which are involved in ownership, the right
to use which is the subject upon which the statute places
the excise duty. In this view the fact of use, not its extent
or its frequency becomes the test, as distinguished from
mere ownership .... 0
Billings involved the constitutionality of Section 37 of the Payne-
Aldrich Tariff Act of 1909 imposing an annual tax on the use of for-
eign built yachts. The lower court differentiated the present case
from Billings on the ground that the tax involved in the Billings
case was a tax on personal property rather than on real property.1 1
Justice Roberts noted this difference in his dissent, and also at-
tacked the analogy on the basis of the constitutional challenge
which was at issue.12 In Billings the challenge was based on the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment" while the
attack in Wanamaker is based on the uniformity clause of the
Pennsylvania Constitution.'4 A comparison of the two shows that
the Pennsylvania uniformity clause is stronger than the federal
prohibition against unequal taxation. The fourteenth amendment
as applied to the states guarantees equal protection of the laws.
The Pennsylvania uniformity clause provides that "All taxes shall
be uniform, upon the same class of subjects, within the territorial
limits of the authority levying the tax ....
In his concurring opinion Chief Justice Bell admits that if the
tax were indeed a property tax, it would have to comply with the
uniformity requirement. However, he felt that the tax was an ex-
cise tax. In his view the confusion originated from a poorly
worded ordinance.' 6
The court distinguishes between active and passive uses. The
privilege of using, they decided, is a purely passive right which
exists wherever there is ownership. The statutory sense of use is
active and goes beyond mere ownership. Although it arises from
ownership, there is always the possibility that the use will not be
9. 232 U.S. 261 (1913).
10. Id. at 280.
11. Wanamaker v. School District of Philadelphia, 441 Pa. 567, 573,
274 A.2d 524, 526 (1971).
12. Id. at 585, 274 A.2d at 532 (dissenting opinion).
13. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV.
14. PA. CONsT. art. VIn, § 1.
15. Id.
16. Wanamaker v. School District of Philadelphia, 441 Pa. 567, 579,
274 A.2d 524, 529 (1971) (concurring opinion).
exerted. If not, it remains passive. However, when the right of
use is exercised, it becomes active and available for taxation.17
The court appears to indicate that Wanamaker's and other large de-
partment stores have a choice on what to do with their property.
They can let it sit, convert it into something which would be non-
taxable (such as residences) or, if they choose, can continue as a
large department store and pay the tax. As Justice Roberts pointed
out, this is an unrealistic view. To avoid the tax Wanamaker's
would have to sell or not open for business. In its location, the only
feasible economic use of the land is for a commercial use which
would be subject to the tax. 8 "Constitutional provisions as to
equality and uniformity of taxation have been held to be mandatory
and their requirements cannot be frittered away by judicial con-
struction."' 9 Yet that is what the majority seems intent on doing.
What the majority does today is to judicially revise the
Uniformity Clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution to per-
mit the classification of real property. This revision has
no basis in reason, logic, or policy, and is clearly contrary to
existing Pennsylvania law. Nor is this revision mandated
by any decision of the United States Supreme Court. Thus,
the majority today grants constitutional sanctity to a real
estate taxing device that has no legal or economic justifica-
tion and violates every heretofore recognized principle of
uniformity in real estate and creates for the first time in
Pennsylvania a judicially sanctioned discrimination in land
taxation.
20
The uniformity clause has traditionally stood for the principle
that tax valuation on the same classes of subjects must be uniform.
Real estate has always been held to be of one class. 21 Justice Rob-
erts feels that the majority, by a sleight of hand has sanctioned
the local taxing authorities to subdivide real estate taxes into dif-
ferent classifications by simply labelling it as a tax on a use. He
does not think it is possible to separate the privilege of using from
the ownership itself.22 The only practical use to which Wanamak-
er's property could be put is a commercial use. When the only use
to which the property could be put is attacked, that is an attack on
the property itself. "A tax levied on the only use to which property
can be put is a tax levied by reason of ownership, and therefore a
tax on the property. '23  The majority's decision that Wanamaker's
really had a choice on the use to make of their property is totally
unrealistic.
The majority also did not satisfactorily answer the lower courts
claim that the standard of measurement was not directly related to
17. 441 Pa. at 574, 274 A.2d at 527.
18. Id. at 588, 274 A.2d at 534 (dissenting opinion).
19. 84 C.J.S. Taxation § 23.
20. Wanamaker v. School District of Philadelphia, 441 Pa. 567, 590-91,
274 A.2d 524, 535 (1971) (dissenting opinion).
21. Id. at 580-81, 274 A.2d at 530 (dissenting opinion).
22. Id. at 581, 274 A.2d at 531 (dissenting opinion).
23. Thompson v. McLeod, 112 Miss. 383, 73 S. 891 (1918).
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the privilege but instead was based directly on the assessed value
of the land. The majority felt that the additions in the formula
24 of
the factor of the space occupied and number of days of business
were the true tests of the taxing assessments. The court admits
that if the tax were assessed solely in the manner of a real estate
tax, that it would be a factor leading to the determination of the
true nature of the tax, although not the only factor. But they feel
that the aspects of space and time in the equation remove the pri-
mary basis for the tax from the real estate assessment. 25 However,
it is plain that most businesses would be open approximately the
same number of days a year, and that the other factor which the ma-
jority emphasizes would also be substantially the same for every
business. Any efficient business would utilize as much of its space
as possible. Therefore, the only factor which would materially dif-
fer from business to business would be the assessed value of the
property. As the chancellor noted:
Moreover, even the indirect relationship between the exer-
cise of the privilege of business occupancy and the value
of the real estate occupied is not given effect in the taxing
provision. The standard of measurement is not more re-
lated to business use or occupancy than it is to residential
or any other use or occupancy. In fact, the tax is measured
without regard to whether the particular occupancy is an
economic one. What the standard of measuring the tax
is directly related to is the ownership interest in property
not produced by or dependent upon the exercise of the
privilege said to be taxed.
26
For the tax to not be a tax on real estate, it must have another ele-
ment of valuation.
The uniformity clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution grants
to Pennsylvanians the assurance that they will be taxed equally
with their neighbors. All real estate taxes are to be assessed uni-
formly. The Wanamaker decision puts this in doubt. The desper-
ate need for revenue for the schools of Philadelphia has been allevi-
ated at the expense of the uniformity clause. If the Philadelphia
Board of Education can assess property under the guise of assessing
a use, there is nothing to prevent other school districts or local units
in need of money from also assessing the privilege to use property
separately from the privilege of ownership.
JANE F. WOODSIDE
24. See text accompanying note 2 supra.
25. Wanamaker v. School District of Philadelphia, 441 Pa. 567, 577,
274 A.2d 524, 528 (1971).
26. Opinion of Judge Spaeth, quoted by Mr. Justice Roberts in the
dissenting opinion. Id. at 590, 274 A.2d at 535 (dissenting opinion).
EVIDENCE-PAROL EVIDENCE INADMISSIBLE
TO OPEN CONFESSED JUDGMENT
Emperee v. Meyers, 440 Pa. 430, 269 A.2d 731 (1970).
On May 9,1964, Iris Meyers and her husband executed a simple
judgment note with a confession of judgment clause in favor of Vin-
cent Emperee. The face amount of the note was $10,000, with pay-
ment to be made one day after the date of execution. Iris Meyers
was president and sole shareholder of Bar Crescent, Inc., a corpora-
tion formed to purchase and operate a restaurant and bar. Emperee
was to be employed as bartender and manager of the establishment.
He began employment in May, 1964, having left his own business as
owner of a used car lot. Emperee worked in the bar for thirteen
months before he left because of a fight with Iris Meyers or because
of lack of interest. On September 2, 1965, he caused judgment to be
entered by confession. Meyers filed a petition obtaining a rule to
show cause why the judgment should not be opened. The lower
court discharged the rule and Meyers appealed.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held1 that testimony 2 by
Emperee that Iris Meyers told him she would give him the note if
he would go into business with her was "merely a statement as to
the facts surrounding his receipt of the note" and not "an admission
of the existence of a contemporaneous oral agreement."8  In so
holding the majority of the court rejected the contention of the
maker that the alleged admission fit within a recognized exception
to the parol evidence rule.4 Justice Roberts, in a dissenting opinion
joined by Justice Eagen, felt that the parol evidence rule should not
1. Emperee v. Meyers, 400 Pa. 430, 269 A.2d 731 (1970).
2. The testimony, as reported in the Emperee decision, reads:
Q. Will you tell us in your own words, Mr. Emperee, the reason
for your receiving this $10,000.00 note that's involved in this law
suit? A. Well, Mrs. Meyers wanted to go into business, and she
said she would give me this if I would go in business with her in
the Bar Crescent; if we would find a bar she would make me a
partner.
440 Pa. at 436, 269 A.2d at 733 (1970).
3. Emperee v. Meyers, 440 Pa. 430, 436, 269 A.2d 731, 734 (1970).
4. The court noted that the exception, as enunciated in Yuhas v.
Schmidt, 434 Pa. 447, 258 A.2d 616 (1969); Boyd Estate, 394 Pa. 225, 146
A.2d 816 (1958); and Allinger v. Melvin, 315 Pa. 298, 172 A. 712 (1934); is:
[W] here a party seeking to enforce the written instrument admits
that the written instrument did not fully and completely state the
entire agreement between the parties, parol evidence is admissible
to explain and supplement the written instrument.
Emperee v. Meyers, 440 Pa. 430, 436, 269 A.2d 731, 733 (1970).
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apply to a simple judgment note with a confession clause at all, be-
cause such a note could not be considered a "'contract complete
within itself.' "'
Emperee v. Meyers6 is noteworthy for three major reasons:
(1) the wide disparity among the members of the court as to the
applicable law, (2) the absence of a written discussion of several
contentions raised on appeal, and (3) the retreat of the court from
recent movements against confession of judgment notes.
(1) Disparity as to Applicable Law
The first issue raised by the parties on appeal was whether the
parol evidence rule prohibited introduction of the alleged contempo-
raneous oral agreement. Meyers contended that Boyd Estate7 per-
mitted such introduction if the party enforcing the note admitted
that the contract was not complete.8 Furthermore, Meyers con-
ended 9 that Yuhas v. Schmidt"0 held that the admission need only
be "that there was some oral agreement";"' the enforcing party need
not admit the entire portion of the agreement. On the other hand,
Emperee argued that Boyd Estate"2 supported appellant only if
Emperee had admitted that the terms, as the parties intended them,
were omitted by fraud, accident or mistake.
13
The majority of the court agreed with Meyers' contention that
if Emperee admitted the existence of terms not contained in the
note, parol evidence could be admitted to show the alleged contem-
poraneous oral agreement. Although it did not expressly reject
Emperee's reading of Boyd, the court seemed either to have rejected
it impliedly or to have felt the case could be decided in another
way.14 Rather than discussing the possible limitations of Boyd, the
majority decided that the testimony of Emperee did not amount to
an admission and that parol evidence was inadmissible.15 This hold-
5. 440 Pa. 430, 438, 269 A.2d 731, 734 (dissenting opinion), quoting
from Gianni v. R. Russell & Co., 281 Pa. 320, 323, 126 A. 791, 792 (1928).
6. 440 Pa. 430, 269 A.2d 731 (1970).
7. 394 Pa. 225, 146 A.2d 816 (1958).
8. Brief for Appellant at 9, Emperee v. Meyers, 440 Pa. 430, 269 A.2d
731 (1970).
9. Id. at 10.
10. 434 Pa. 447, 258 A.2d 616 (1969).
11. Id. at 459, 258 A.2d at 621.
12. 394 Pa. 225, 146 A.2d 816 (1958).
13. Brief for Appellee at 13-14, Emperee v. Meyers, 440 Pa. 430, 269
A.2d 731 (1970).
14. The majority cites Boyd Estate as authority for the exception to
the parol evidence rule that arises when the party enforcing the contracts
admits that the written agreement was not complete; Emperee v. Meyers,
440 Pa. 430, 436, 269 A.2d 731, 733 (1970).
15. Id. at 436, 269 A.2d at 734.
mng relieved the court from deciding the remaining issues.
The conclusion of the dissent differed markedly from that of
the majority. The dissent argued that the parol evidence rule should
never be applied to a judgment note with a confession clause. 16
Human nature being what it is, people do not generally
promise to pay money to others without receiving a quid
pro quo.
.* I am unable, however, to subscribe to the view
that this rule (parol evidence) ought to be utilized when
the writing involved consists of a simple judgment note
containing only the unilateral undertaking of the maker.
Such a document can hardly be termed a "contract com-
plete within itself", and should not be covered by the parol
evidence rule.' 7
In support of this argument, Justice Roberts noted a number
of older cases which "endorsed"18 his position that the parol evi-
dence rule should not apply at all to confession of judgment notes.
One of these cases, Bown v. Morange,19 concluded:
[I] t is very remarkable that a provision so important to the
defendant should have been omitted from the writing pre-
pared and signed by counsel; but, unreasonable and incred-
ible as defendant's allegations as to the verbal agreement
in question may appear, he is entitled under our decisions
to establish them if he can by competent and satisfactory
evidence.
20
The differences between the majority opinion and the dissent
seem irreconcilable. The question remains unanswered why the
majority ignored prior Pennsylvania case law supporting an argu-
ment which would dispose of the issue. Clearly, the approach taken
by the dissent marks the basis of another attack on confession of
judgment notes.
(2) Absence of Written Discussion of Several Contentions
The remaining issues raised on appeal were not discussed by
the majority. The probable reason is that their decision eliminated
the necessity to discuss any further contentions. The first of these
questions was whether the testimony satisfied the requirement of
Boyd that the terms must have been fraudulently omitted before
any evidence of a contemporaneous oral agreement would be admis-
16. It is interesting to note that Meyers, who was attempting to
open the judgment, did not raise this question on appeal.
17. Emperee v. Meyers, 440 Pa. 430, 438, 269 A.2d 731, 734 (1970) (dis-
senting opinion).
18. The dissent made the following comment in a footnote:
That this has always been the correct rule is clearly illustrated
by the many cases which have endorsed this result from times as
early as the 19th Century, See, e.g., Davidson v. Young, 167 Pa. 265,
31 A. 557 (1895); Bown v. Morange, 108 Pa. 69 (1885); Lippincott v.
Whitman, 83 Pa. 244 (1877); Ayer's Appeal, 28 Pa. 179 (1857);
Packer v. Hook, 16 S. & R. 327 (1827); Sommer v. Wilt, 4 S. & R. 19
(1818).
Id. at 438 n., 269 A.2d at 734-35 n.
19. 108 Pa. 69 (1885).
20. Id. at 75 (citations omitted).
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sible. Appellant Meyers argued that testimony by the maker of the
note and the attorney showed that the note was not to be used until
an outstanding corporate debt was paid. Since the note was con-
fessed before the debt was paid, Meyers contended this was suffi-
cient fraud to open the judgment.
21
Appellee Emperee contended that there was no fraud because
there was no misrepresentation of a past or present fact:
[A] t most, the Oral Evidence would tend to show a breach
of faith in promising not to do something in the future and,
as a matter of law, such conduct does not constitute fraud.
22
Emperee also argued that case law28 indicates Meyers must show
that the alleged oral agreement was fraudulently omitted, not
fraudulently made.
24
The questions that were raised concerning the allegation of
fraud seem to be important to determination of the case. Rather
than draw a somewhat narrow distinction between an admission
versus an explanation of the facts surrounding the making of the
note, it is submitted the court could have decided the appeal on the
question of fraud. However, it chose not to discuss this problem.
A second issue left undecided by the majority was whether an
alleged failure of consideration constituted a valid defense to the
Confession of judgment. Emperee argued 25 that even if Meyers'
testimony as to the reason for Emperee's termination of employ-
ment were accepted by the court, the Uniform Written Obligations
Act 2B prohibits failure of consideration as a valid defense to confes-
sion of judgment notes.
2 7
The majority does not discuss this issue. The dissent, however,
concludes-without any reference to the Uniform Written Obliga-
tions Act-that "parol evidence is always competent to show want
or failure of consideration. '28 Even though the parol evidence as
21. Brief for Appellant at 12-14, Emperee v. Meyers, 440 Pa. 430, 269
A.2d 731 (1970).
22. Brief for Appellee at 16, Emperee v. Meyers, 440 Pa. 430, 269 A.2d
731 (1970).
23. Nicolla v. Palmer, 432 Pa. 502, 248 A.2d 20 (1968).
24. Brief for Appellee at 16.
25. Id. at 15.
26. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 6 (1967).
27. The Uniform Written Obligations Act provides:
A written release or promise, hereafter made or signed by the per-
son releasing or promising, shall not be invalid or unenforceable
for lack of consideration, if the writing also contains an additional
express statement, in any form of language, that the signer in-
tends to be legally bound.
Id.
28. Emperee v. Meyers, 440 Pa. 430, 438, 269 A.2d 731, 735 (1970) (dis-
senting opinion).
to failure of consideration would be admissible if the dissent were
accepted, the question still remains whether failure of consideration
is a valid defense.
(3) Retreat From Recent Movements Against Confession Of Judg-
ment Notes
Recently, confession of judgment notes have been under at-
tack.29 Pennsylvania, Illinois and Ohio are the only states which do
not restrict confessions of judgment. Two recent cases have been
directed at Pennsylvania confession of judgment notes. In Swarb
v. Lennox,30 the Eastern District Court of Pennsylvania held that
confession of judgment is unconstitutional as applied to individual
residents of Pennsylvania with incomes less than $10,000. The New
York Court of Appeals, in Atlas Credit Corp. v. Ezrine,31 refused to
enforce a Pennsylvania confession of judgment, arguing that it was
not an actual "judgment" and that it violated due process. In addi-
tion, the Federal Truth In Lending Act and Regulation Z give the
consumer the right to rescind the confession of judgment if the "se-
curity interest is or will be retained or acquired in any real property
which is used or expected to be used as the principal residence of the
customer.
2
The decision in Emperee v. Meyers33 retreats from this recent
trend, upholding a confession of judgment note by application of
the parol evidence rule. If the parol evidence rule is inapplicable,
as the dissent argues, 34 the case presents another opportunity to re-
strict the enforceability of confession of judgment notes. The ma-
jority chose not to take the opportunity.
ROBERT F. Cox, JR.
29. 74 DICK. L. REv. 750, 751 (1970).
30. 314 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa. 1970), prob. juris. noted, 91 S.Ct. 1220
(1971); noted in 75 DICK. L. REV. 169 (1970).
31. 25 N.Y.2d 219, 250 N.E.2d 474, 303 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1969), noted in 74
DICK. L. REv. 750 (1970).
32. The Truth in Lending Act, Title I of the Federal Consumer Credit
Protection Act § 125, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1968); Regulation Z § 226.9, 12 C.F.R.
§ 226 (1969).
33. 440 Pa. 430, 269 A.2d 731 (1970).
34. Id. at 438, 269 A.2d at 734-35 (dissenting opinion).
TORTS: IMPUTED CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE-
IMPUTATION ONLY IN MASTER-
SERVANT RELATIONSHIPS
Smalich v. Westfall, 440 Pa. 409, 269 A.2d 476 (1970)
In Smalich v. West-fall,' the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held
that when the owner of an automobile is present during its negli-
gent operation by another, the contributory negligence of the
driver will be imputed to the owner only when the relationship
between them is one of master-servant. 2 In adopting the position
of the Restatement of Torts,3 the court overruled a long line of
Pennsylvania cases.
4
Julia Smalich was the owner and passenger in a car driven by
Felix Westfall which was involved in an automobile collision with a
vehicle driven by Stephanna Blank. Julia Smalich died as a re-
sult of injuries sustained in the accident. The estate of Julia Sma-
lich instituted a trespass action against co-defendants Blank and
Westfall. At trial, Westfall's contributory negligence was found to
be a proximate cause of the collision. The jury returned a verdict
in favor of the estate of Julia Smalich as against co-defendants
Blank and Westfall. The trial court en banc rendered a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict since under existing Pennsylvania law
the contributory negligence of the driver had to be imputed to the
owner-passenger. On appeal the supreme court reversed this de-
cision, holding that the imputation of contributory negligence was
not warranted in this case.5
In Pennsylvania the imputation of the contributory negligence
of a driver to a passenger had been based upon the passenger's
theoretical right to control the conduct of the driver6 This right
1. 440 Pa. 409, 269 A.2d 476 (1970).
2. Id. at 412, 269 A.2d at 480.
3. Id. at 423, 269 A.2d at 485 (concurring opinion) referring to RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 485, 486, 491 (1965).
4. See Beam v. Pittsburgh R.R., 366 Pa. 360, 77 A.2d 634 (1951);
Mazur v. Klewans, 365 Pa. 76, 73 A.2d 397 (1950); Von Cannon v. P.T.C.,
148 Pa. Super. 330, 25 A.2d 584 (1942); Spegala v. Blumfield, 120 Pa.
Super. 231, 182 A. 149 (1935).
5. Julia Smalich's minor son, Michael, was also a passenger in the
automobile at the time of the accident. Marco Smalich, guardian of
Michael, sought damages in the same trespass action for the latter's inju-
ries resulting from the accident. After a favorable jury verdict, the trial
court granted a motion for a new trial in the actions on behalf of the minor
and guardian. The supreme court upheld this use of the trial court's dis-
cretion.
6. Beam v. Pittsburgh R.R., 366 Pa. 360, 371, 77 A.2d 634, 639 (1951).
to control was dependent upon the legal relation between the
driver and the passenger.7 In the absence of any evidence to the
contrary, there was a presumption that the legal relation was
such that an owner present in his car had the power to control it.8
Therefore, if this presumption went unrebutted, the contributory
negligence of a driver would be imputed to an owner-passenger,
barring recovery.9
In Smalich, the court re-evaluated this critical relationship be-
tween the driver and the owner-passenger. 10 The court found that
"[A]t least three relationships could exist between an owner-
passenger and a driver of an automobile: (1) bailor-bailee; (2)
principal-agent; and (3) master servant."" In a bailment the con-
tributory negligence of the bailee generally is not imputed to the
bailor to prevent an action by the bailor against a negligent third
party.12 Similarly, in the typical agency situation the principal is
not barred from recovering from a negligent third party because of
the unauthorized negligence of his agent.13 However, a master will
be prevented from recovering against a negligent defendant by the
contributory negligence of his servant acting within the scope of his
authority.14 Since a master has the right to control the servant's
physical activities, he is held vicariously liable for the negligence
of his servant.' 5 Therefore the court reasoned that he ought to
be barred from recovering from a negligent third party by the
contributory negligence of his servant.16 Thus the court held that
the imputation of contributory negligence would only be justified
upon the finding that the relationship between the passenger and




8. Id. at 371, 77 A.2d at 640.
9. Id.
10. 440 Pa. 409, 269 A.2d 476 (1970).
11. Id. at 413, 269 A.2d at 480. The court uses qualified language:
"At least three relationships...." Therefore one can wonder whether
this reflects merely a casual use of language by the court, a conscious
omission of other irrelevant relationships or a doubt by the court con-
cerning other possible relevant relationships. It is submitted that the
first two of these possibilities are the more likely. The court implied that
their analysis was a careful one. Thus any question in the mind of the
court as to the relevance of another relationship should have at least been
noted.
12. Id. citing PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 73 (3d ed. 1964); RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 486 (1965). However, a bailee's con-
tributory negligence bars recovery by a bailor in Texas. See Weir v.
Petty, 355 S.W.2d 192 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962).
13. 440 Pa. at 414, 269 A.2d at 481 (citing Commonwealth v. Minds
Coal Mining Corp., 360 Pa. 7, 60 A.2d 14 (1945); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF AGENCY § 20 (1958)).
14. 440 Pa. at 415, 269 A.2d at 481 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 486 (1966); PROSSEE, THE LAW OF TORTS § 73 (3d ed. 1964)).
15. 440 Pa. at 415, 269 A.2d at 481.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 416, 269 A.2d at 481. The court conceded that the facts of
the case did not require a holding as to joint enterprise. Of more sig-
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The court felt that ordinarily the relationship between the
owner-passenger and the driver would not be that of master-
servant.'8 However, such a relationship could exist when the
owner-passenger reserved not only the right to determine such
matters as destination but also retained the right to control the
physical details involved in the actual driving.1 9 Consequently,
a factual determination by a jury would generally be necessary to
determine the character of the relationship between the owner-
passenger and the driver.20 The court concluded that the presence
of the owner no longer creates a presumptive legal relationship
through which the contributory negligence of the driver must be
imputed to the owner-passenger. 21
It is submitted that the majority opinion in Smalich suffers
from a critical weakness. Contributory negligence is imputed in
the master-servant relationship because of the master's right to
control his servant and car.22 But the imputation of contributory
negligence to the master presupposes that the master has been
negligent in exercising this right to control. 2' If the master is
actually free of negligence there is no good reason why he should
be prevented from recovering from a negligent third party. If
someone teaching another how to drive 24 has behaved in an inno-
cent fashion, why should the distinct contributory negligence of
the learning driver be imputed to him? Similarly, why should
the contributory negligence of a driver following actual instruc-
tions21 prevent an owner-passenger from recovering full damages
if the directions given were free from fault? The court never ex-
plains what quality there is in the right to control that warrants
the imputation of contributory negligence.
nificance is the fact that in giving its reasoning for the decision, the court
never once mentioned, much less analyzed, the nature of a joint enter-
prise relationship. Thus, the court adopted the essence of the RESTAT-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 491 (1965) without providing any justification
for it. The forcefulness of the court's language indicates that the joint
enterprise proviso of the holding was not mere dicta: "We therefore
now state unequivocally that only a master-servant relationship or a find-
ing of a joint enterprise will justify an imputation of contributory negli-
gence." Id.
18. 440 Pa. at 416, 269 A.2d at 482.
19. Id. at 416-17, 269 A.2d at 482. The court suggests that a master-
servant relationship might exist "if the driver were inexperienced, or
learning, a prospective purchaser or driving under actual directions." Id.
n.4 Note that it is the control aspect, and not the economic relationship,
that is decisive.
20. Id. at 418, 269 A.2d at 483.
21. Id. at 417, 269 A.2d at 482.
22. See note 6 and accompanying text supra.
23. Weber v. Stokeley-Van Camp, Inc., 274 Minn. 482, 485, 144 N.W.2d
540, 545 (1966).
24. See note 19 supra.
25. See note 19 supra.
The court began its analysis with the premise that contribu-
tory negligence will only be imputed in those legal relations in
which negligence will be imputed. 26 This imputation of negligence
"both ways" 27 has been severely criticized. The doctrine of im-
puted negligence was developed for the purpose of furnishing in-
jured plaintiffs with financially responsible defendants.2 8  How-
ever, imputation of contributory negligence prevents an innocent
injured plaintiff from recovering from a negligent, financially re-
sponsible defendant. 29  While the purpose of imputed primary
negligence was to expand the scope of liability, imputed contribu-
tory negligence effectively restricts this scope.3 0  Thus, the doc-
trine of imputed contributory negligence violates the policy justi-
fying the creation and extension of vicarious liability.
3 1
In a concurring opinion 32 to Smalich, Justice Roberts criti-
cized what he considered the majority's inadequate reforms in im-
puted contributory negligence .3 He submitted that the owner-
passenger's right to control the vehicle is an "absurd fiction. '34 He
asserted that in reality an owner-passenger cannot safely exercise
operational control of the automobile in which he rides2 5 In our
modern era of high-speed highways, any attempt by a passenger
to wrest control of an automobile from a negligent driver would
be dangerous behavior in itself." Of equal danger are persistent,
disturbing oral directions emanating from the back seat. 7 These
dangers exist whether the relationship between the owner-passen-
ger and the driver is one of bailor-bailee, principal-agent or master-
servant.38 Thus, Mr. Justice Roberts argued that the holding of the
majority places the master in a strange dilemma. Because he can-
not recover damages due to the contributory negligence of the
driver, the master is encouraged to actively seek to keep his poten-
tially negligent driver out of danger; yet this behavior by the mas-
ter may very likely be negligence in itself.3 9 Therefore, because
the holding of the majority40 is based on a fiction and because the
holding of the majority places an owner-passenger in a bewildering
position. Justice Roberts would not even impute a driver's con-
26. 440 Pa. at 412, 269 A.2d at 480.
27. For a history and discussion of this "both-ways" imputation con-
cept, see 2 F. HARPER AND F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 23.1 (1956).
28. 440 Pa. at 423, 209 A.2d at 485 (concurring opinion).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 422, 269 A.2d at 485.
32. 440 Pa. 409, 420, 269 A.2d 476, 483 (1970) (concurring opinion).
33. Id. at 420, 269 A.2d at 484.
34. 440 Pa. at 420, 269 A.2d at 484.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 421, 269 A.2d at 484.
37. Id. at 422, 269 A.2d at 485.
38. Id. at 423, 269 A.2d at 485.
39. Id. at 421, 269 A.2d at 484. Justice Roberts suggests that per-
haps the only safe alternative for the owner-passenger is to go to sleep.
Id.
40. See text accompanying note 17 supra.
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tributory negligence to an owner-passenger in a master-servant or
joint enterprise relationship.
41
However, Justice Roberts' concurring opinion is also open to
criticism. It is questionable whether or not a master's right to
control the vehicle is an "absurd fiction."42 It is conceded that on
a high speed highway, the owner-passenger cannot safely exercise
a right to control an automobile.4" But of equal certainty is the
existence, and occasional exercise, of a driving instructor's right to
control an automobile driven by a novice. Furthermore, public
safety warrants the retention of this right to control the vehicle,
especially during the initial training period.44 Thus, it could be
argued that the majority holding is hardly based on an imaginary
situation.
While the right to control is not always an "absurd fiction,"
it is submitted that it is an irrelevant justification. No satis-
factory reason is provided by the supreme court why the right to
control the vehicle should generate imputed contributory negli-
gence. 4" Nor have other justifications for the doctrine of imputed
contributory negligence been deemed valid.
Professor Freidenthal has catalogued and analyzed these un-
satisfactory rationalizations. 4 It has been suggested that the im-
putation of contributory negligence was warranted because the
owner-passenger assumes the risk of his driver's negligence. 4- But
if this were the case, then an owner would be unable to recover
from a negligent permittee.48 The only real risk that the owner
assumes is that of the general peril involved in driving; if this
constituted assumption of risk, then there could be no automobile
accident liability at all.
49
41. 440 Pa. at 423, 269 A.2d at 485. Note that Justice Roberts also
made the logical argument against the imputation of contributory negli-
gence in general, found in the text accompanying note 29 supra. See 440
Pa. at 422, 269 A.2d at 484.
42. See note 51 and accompanying text infra.
43. See note 53 and accompanying text infra.
44. Perhaps the majority and concurring opinions can be reconciled
somewhat by limiting the value of the master-servant relationship. For
example, if a master-servant relationship would cease to exist at the time
a driving instructor took his more experienced student out for practice on a
high speed highway and, therefore, effectively relinquished his right to
control the car, then the two opinions would be consistent in this area.
45. See text accompanying notes 22-25 supra.
46. Friedenthal, Imputed Contributory Negligence: The Anomaly in
California's Vehicle Code Section 17150, 17 STAN. L. REv. 55 (1964) [here-
inafter cited as FRiEDENTHAL].
47. Id. at 9.
48. Id. at 60. See also Beam v. Pittsburgh R.R., 366 Pa. 360, 364,
77 A.2d 634, 636 (1951).
49. FPUEDENTHAL at 60.
It has also been suggested that the imputation of contributory
negligence is warranted because a negligent third party to an acci-
dent does not expect that he will be held liable for damages caused
in part by the negligence of another driver.5 0 It is doubtful,
though, if a negligent third party driver contemplates such consid-
erations, 51 or that such a remote expectation would affect the
manner in which he operates his motor vehicle. 52 The contribu-
tory negligence of a driver does not prevent recovery by a non-
negligent passenger from a negligent third party.53 Nor does the
contributory negligence of the driver prevent recovery by an owner
who did not give the driver permission to operate the vehicle.
54
From the perspective of the negligent third party, the presence of
innocent passengers in the other vehicle or a driver's failure to ob-
tain permission is an accidental circumstance.5 5 The presence of
an owner as a passenger in the other vehicle is as equally fortui-
tous. Therefore, the expectation of a negligent third party that he
will not be held liable for damages caused in part by the negli-
gence of another driver is not a very reasonable one and does not
justify the imputation of contributory negligence.
Finally, it has been submitted by some that care in selecting
permittee drivers will also be promoted by the imputation of con-
tributory negligence.56 However, this proposition is also subject
to doubt. There is first the dubious assumption that owner-pas-
sengers know the law and that such knowledge would influence
their selection. 57 Also, because an owner is provided with other
incentives to encourage him to exercise maximum care in selecting
permittee drivers, the imputation of contributory negligence prob-
ably would not increase the already high degree of care in making
this selection. 58 An owner-passenger is primarily liable if he is
negligent in selecting the driver.5 9 He will also often be liable to
innocent third parties if the negligent permittee driver is not finan-
cially responsible.60 Furthermore, an owner-passenger has the
very real incentive of the preservation of his life.6 ' With these
highly effective incentives already at work, it is highly unlikely
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. But see Weber v. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., 274 Minn. 482,
485, 144 N.W.2d 540, 545 (1966).
53. FRIEDENTHAL at 60. See also Rodgers v. Saxton, 30 Pa. 479, 484,
158 A. 166, 169 (1931).
54. FRIEDENTHAL at 60. See also Rodgers v. Saxton, 30 Pa. 479, 484,
158 A. 166, 169 (1931).
55. FRIEDENTHAL at 60.
56. Id. at 61.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. See also Delair v. McAdoo, 324 Pa. 392, 394, 188 A. 181, 182
(1936).
60. FRIEDENTHAL at 61. See also Palmer v. Moren, 44 F. Supp. 704,
710 (M.D. Pa. 1942).
61. FRIEDENTHAL at 61.
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that the imputation of contributory negligence will increase care
in selecting permittee drivers.
Thus the doctrine of imputed contributory negligence is with-
out justification. Perhaps the supreme court is confusing the con-
tributory negligence of the servant imputed to the master under
the vicarious liability theory and the master's negligence in his own
right.62 Certainly, contributory negligence of the servant should
be imputed where the primary negligence of the master himself
causes the injury. 6 However, these situations do not demand the
guise of imputed contributory negligence. Should a situation arise
in which the master is completely free from fault, it is submitted
that the imputation to him of his servant's contributory negligence
is not justified. Thus, it is urged that the recommendation of
Justice Roberts be adopted eliminating the use of imputed con-
tributory negligence in all circumstances, including where there is
a master-servant relationship.
ELLIOT A. STROKOFF
62. However, the court does claim it makes the distinction. See 440
Pa. at 417, 269 A.2d at 486.
63. For example; suppose a learning driver's contributory negligence
is a proximate cause of an accident on a high speed highway. Under
many circumstances his teacher would be deemed negligent in taking his
student out on such a road.
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